(Not to beat a dead horse even more but, BUY SOME GOLD and SILVER! YES THIS MEANS YOU WILLY!)
From Gold Core
$1 Billion of Gold Bars Taken Delivery Of By Pension Fund Due to Risk of COMEX Default and Shortages
Concerns that the sovereign debt crisis may be entering a new phase and the risk of contagion has seen peripheral eurozone bonds fall sharply and the euro fall against major currencies and gold today.
Sovereign debt risk, global inflation concerns, geopolitical risk, disappointing European earnings and concerns about Japan's coming reporting season have seen equities weaken and new record nominal highs for gold and silver (all time and 31 year).
Greek bond yields have continued their relentless march higher and have risen above 14.07% (10 year) and Portuguese debt (10 year) has risen to a euro era record over 9.27%.Spanish and Irish debt are also under pressure this morning.
Euro gold has been in a range between €900 and €1,070 for nearly a year (since last May – see chart) and this period of consolidation looks set to come to an end as gold pushes higher. Once the technical resistance at the record high of €1,072/oz (12/28/10) is breached, gold will challenge €1,100/oz .
In the current bull market, euro gold has seen many long periods of correction and consolidation prior to rapid gains and sharp moves upwards. The length of the recent correction (almost a year) suggests that the coming move could be very sharp and see gold rise to €1,200/oz in the coming weeks.
Gold is increasingly being seen as the superior currency in a world of trillion dollar and euro deficits and bailouts. Indeed, the printing and electronic creation of billion and trillions of the major paper currencies is increasingly making gold and silver the currencies of last resort.
Governments and central banks are debasing currencies through bailouts, deficit spending and quantitative easing which is leading to a massive increase in the supply of fiat currencies. Precious metals are rare and finite and this is why major currencies are falling in value versus gold and silver.
One of the largest pension funds in the world, the University of Texas Investment Management Co (which manages the endowment for the Texas teachers pension fund), has realized this and has put 5% of the pension fund into gold bullion (see news).
Unusually, but likely to be seen more frequently in the coming weeks and months, the pension fund has opted to own physical bars worth nearly $1 billion dollars in allocated accounts.
The fund has previously expressed concerns about the counter party risk in ETFs. However, the reason given for opting for taking delivery of 100 oz gold bars in a warehouse was that if the holders of just 5 percent of COMEX futures contracts opted to take delivery of the metal, there wouldn’t be enough to cover the demand leading to a COMEX default.
The risk of a COMEX default increases by the day and appears to be moving from the realms of the “conspiracy theory” to that of “of course we knew it would happen, it stands to reason and was inevitable”.
A COMEX default would have serious ramifications for the dollar and all fiat currencies as it would further erode trust in central banks, fiat currencies and today’s monetary system.
NEWS
(Financial Times) -- Euro slides on sovereign debt fears
Reports that Greece had asked for a debt restructuring – subsequently denied by Athens – have rattled the euro and the continent’s bourses.
Markets were initially proving stoic in adjusting to a tighter monetary environment, with traders betting that the global economy can absorb central banks’ moves to drain excess liquidity.
The People’s Bank of China increased its reserve ratio for the country’s banks by half a point to 20.5 per cent over the weekend – the fourth time this year it has used the tool to tighten liquidity – following a 5.4 per cent rise in March consumer prices.
But shortly after European markets opened, Reuters reported a Greek newspaper as saying that Athens had asked the International Monetary Fund and European Union to restructure its sovereign debt.
The euro was already weaker after an anti-euro party gained ground in the Finnish general election, raising questions about whether the bloc will be able to agree a bail-out for Portugal.
The Greek newsflash saw the single currency shed nearly 1 per cent to $1.43, while the FTSE Eurofirst 300 index stumbled as investors sold those banks with high sovereign debt exposure.
Factors to Watch
It’s a light week for US macroeconomic data, so the market is likely to be more focused on the ongoing first-quarter earnings season. On Monday, the highlights include Citigroup, Halliburton and Texas Instruments.
An unattributed official denial of the Greek restructuring story helped brake the slide, and the euro is now down 0.6 per cent to $1.4334, with the Eurofirst off 0.4 per cent. The S&P 500 futures contract points to a 0.3 per cent fall when Wall Street opens and Treasury yields are slightly softer as risk aversion rises a touch.
Nevertheless, the FTSE All-World equity index is lower by just 0.3 per cent, helped by a belief that Beijing’s attempts to rein in lending and cool inflationary pressures is not so aggressive that it will derail growth in the world’s second-biggest economy. Shanghai’s Composite index rose 0.2 per cent.
In keeping with this underlying optimism about the global economy, industrial metals are firmer – copper is up 0.4 per cent to $4.27 a pound. This in spite of the dollar bouncing off last week’s 16-month lows with a 0.4 per cent advance, a move that would usually be considered commodity-negative.
Investors are having to come to terms with the end of the ultra-loose monetary era in big developed economies following the European Central Bank’s move to raise interest rates from 1 per cent to 1.25 per cent earlier this month and amid increasing acceptance that the US Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing programme will finish on time in June.
Major stock benchmarks are close to cyclical highs, suggesting traders feel corporate profitability will not be too severely affected by the economic impact of this policy shift.
However, some investors seem to believe that central banks are not doing enough to combat inflationary pressures and they are continuing to snap up precious metals to hedge against price rises. Worries about the eurozone are also boosting gold’s haven cachet.
Gold has hit a record high of $1,489 an ounce and is currently up 0.1 per cent at $1,486, while silver has hit a fresh 31-year record of $4.35 an ounce, and is now up 0.4 per cent at $43.17.
The additional support for bullion comes despite a small pullback in oil prices, a commodity that has carried the most inflationary concern for analysts. Brent crude is down 0.5 per cent to $122.88 a barrel as Saudi Arabia challenges the bulls with its contention that the market is oversupplied and it has consequently cut output by 800,000 barrels a day.
Another currency move of note is the yen, which has recaptured the sub-Y83 level relative to the dollar as the post-earthquake intervention impact wanes. With the Bank of Japan staying relatively looser-for-longer, because of the need for increased largesse as the country recovers from the tremor and tsunami, the yen’s interest rate differentials are likely to deteriorate.
This would normally put pressure on the yen, so the currency’s current strength may revive talk that it reflects the much muted repatriation of funds – a trend that if continued could call into question the resumption of the yen carry trade.
This is turn could affect some higher yielding or riskier assets, favourite destination of yen carry trade funds. There is little sign of this so far on Monday, however. The only clear casualty of the yen’s strength is the Tokyo stock market, which has slipped 0.4 per cent as the firmer currency hurts the country’s exporters.
(Bloomberg) -- Gold Climbs to Record as Investors Fret Over Rising Inflation
Gold advanced to record as investors seek the metal as a hedge against inflation. Gold for immediate delivery gained 0.1 percent to $1,488.35 an ounce, while bullion futures for June delivery rose 0.2 percent to $1,489.40 an ounce.
(Bloomberg) -- World Gold Council Says Position Limits Could Impair Liquidity
The World Gold Council said in a letter that proposed position limits in the gold market could “reduce or impair liquidity and trade.” The council published the March 28 letter to the Commodity Futures Trading Commision on its website today.
(Bloomberg) -- Shortage Threat Drives Texas Schools Hoarding Bullion at HSBC
Dallas hedge-fund manager J. Kyle Bass helped advise the University of Texas Investment Management Co. on taking delivery of 6,643 gold bars, worth $987 million on April 15, now stored in a bank warehouse in New York.
Bass, who made $500 million with 2006 bets on a U.S. subprime-mortgage market collapse, said managers of the endowment, known as UTIMCO, sought board approval to convert its gold investments into bullion this year. A board member, Bass, 41, said he was asked to help with that process.
While Bass, a managing partner at Hayman Capital Management LP, said in an April 16 e-mail that “the decision to purchase and take delivery of the physical gold” was made by endowment staff members, “I helped where I could.” Gold futures touched a record $1,489.10 an ounce April 15 in New York before closing at $1,486.
The Texas fund’s $19.9 billion in assets ranked it behind only Harvard University’s endowment as of August, according to the National Association of College and University Business Officers. Last year, UTIMCO added about $500 million in gold investments to an existing stake, said Bruce Zimmerman, the endowment’s chief executive officer. The fund’s managers sought to take delivery of bullion to protect against demand for the metal overwhelming supply, according to Bass.
Open interest in gold futures and options traded on the Comex typically exceeds supplies held in its warehouses. If the holders of just 5 percent of those contracts opted to take delivery of the metal, there wouldn’t be enough to cover the demand, Bass said.
Printing Money
“If you own a paper contract where they can only deliver you 10 cents on the dollar or less, you should probably convert it to physical,” said Bass, who isn’t related to Fort Worth’s billionaire Bass family. He said holding cash wasn’t a better choice because the rate of inflation exceeds money-market rates by 2.5 percent to 3 percent, eroding the value of cash.
“Central banks are printing more money than they ever have, so what’s the value of money in terms of purchases of goods and services,” Bass said April 15 in a telephone interview. “I look at gold as just another currency that they can’t print any more of.”
Sovereign-debt concerns also boosted demand for the metal on April 15, driving Comex futures to an all-time high. The price has climbed 28 percent in the past year.
Gold’s 10-year rally has attracted billionaire investors such as George Soros and John Paulson, who seek a store of value as record-low interest rates erode returns on currencies.
Wealthy Buyers
Few investors take physical delivery of bullion. As of April 14, 2,860 contracts this month, about 0.5 percent of total open interest, had been converted to metal, exchange data show.
Physical deliveries have slowed as gold topped records this year, said Blake Robben, a senior market strategist who handles deliveries of Comex metals for clients at Chicago-based broker Lind-Waldock.
“It’s usually wealthy individuals with net worths over $1 million who want to take delivery to diversify away from the dollar,” Robben said. “Generally, it’s a big hassle and not worth it to take delivery.”
Investors can own 100 ounces of gold futures with Lind- Waldock by paying a $100 fee and putting up $6,571 in a margin account to purchase one contract. To take delivery of a 100- ounce bar, investors have to pay the full price of the contract.
Bass, a Texas Christian University graduate who was named to the endowment’s board in August, is a former salesman with Bear Stearns Cos. and Legg Mason Inc. He said about 5 percent of his hedge fund is invested in gold.
The endowment, which oversees funds held by the University of Texas System and Texas A&M University, has 664,300 ounces of bullion in a Comex-registered vault in New York owned by HSBC Holdings Plc, the London-based bank, according to a report distributed at a meeting in Austin.
“I simply voted as a board member to approve the storage facility and concurred with their decisions,” Bass said.
(Bloomberg) -- Texas University Endowment Storing About $1 Billion in Gold Bars
The University of Texas Investment Management Co., the second-largest U.S. academic endowment, took delivery of almost $1 billion in gold bullion and is storing the bars in a New York vault, according to the fund’s board.
The fund, whose $19.9 billion in assets ranked it behind Harvard University’s endowment as of August, according to the National Association of College and University Business Officers, added about $500 million in gold investments to an existing stake last year, said Bruce Zimmerman, the endowment’s chief executive officer. The holdings are worth about $987 million, based on yesterday’s closing price of $1,486 an ounce for Comex futures.
The decision to turn the fund’s investment into gold bars was influenced by Kyle Bass, a Dallas hedge fund manager and member of the endowment’s board, Zimmerman said at its annual meeting on April 14. Bass made $500 million on the U.S. subprime-mortgage collapse.
“Central banks are printing more money than they ever have, so what’s the value of money in terms of purchases of goods and services,” Bass said yesterday in a telephone interview. “I look at gold as just another currency that they can’t print any more of.”
Gold reached an all-time high of $1,489.10 an ounce yesterday in New York as sovereign debt concerns boosted demand for the metal as a store of value. Gold has climbed 28 percent in the past year on Comex.
The endowment, which oversees funds held by the University of Texas System and Texas A&M University, has 6,643 bars of bullion, or 664,300 ounces, in a Comex-registered vault in New York owned by HSBC Holdings Plc, the London-based bank, according to a report distributed at the meeting in Austin.
Monday, April 18, 2011
S&P Revises US Outlook To Negative (Thanks for Telling us What Everyone Has Already Known For The Past Three Years)
(These people really are the dumbest guys in the room)
From S&P:
Overview
We have affirmed our 'AAA/A-1+' sovereign credit rating on the United States of America.
•The economy of the U.S. is flexible and highly diversified, the country's effective monetary policies have supported output growth while containing inflationary pressures, and a consistent global preference for the U.S. dollar over all other currencies gives the country unique external liquidity.
•Because the U.S. has, relative to its 'AAA' peers, what we consider to be very large budget deficits and rising government indebtedness and the path to addressing these is not clear to us, we have revised our outlook on the long-term rating to negative from stable.
•We believe there is a material risk that U.S. policymakers might not reach an agreement on how to address medium- and long-term budgetary challenges by 2013; if an agreement is not reached and meaningful implementation does not begin by then, this would in our view render the U.S. fiscal profile meaningfully weaker than that of peer 'AAA' sovereigns.
Rating Action
On April 18, 2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'AAA' long-term and 'A-1+' short-term sovereign credit ratings on the United States of America and revised its outlook on the long-term rating to negative from stable.
Rationale
Our ratings on the U.S. rest on its high-income, highly diversified, and flexible economy, backed by a strong track record of prudent and credible monetary policy. The ratings also reflect our view of the unique advantages stemming from the dollar's preeminent place among world currencies. Although we believe these strengths currently outweigh what we consider to be the
U.S.'s meaningful economic and fiscal risks and large external debtor position, we now believe that they might not fully offset the credit risks over the next two years at the 'AAA' level.
The U.S. is among the most flexible high-income nations, with both adaptable labor markets and a long track record of openness to capital flows. In addition, its public sector uses a smaller share of national income than those of most 'AAA' rated countries--including its closest peers, the U.K., France, Germany, and Canada (all AAA/Stable/A-1+)--which implies greater
revenue flexibility.
Furthermore, the U.S. dollar is the world's most used currency, which provides the U.S. with unique external flexibility; the vast majority of U.S. trade flows and external liabilities are denominated in its own dollars. Recent depreciation of the currency has not materially affected this position, and we do not expect this to change in the medium term (see "Après Le Déluge, The U.S. Dollar Remains The Key International Currency," March 10, 2010, RatingsDirect).
Despite these exceptional strengths, we note the U.S.'s fiscal profile has deteriorated steadily during the past decade and, in our view, has worsened further as a result of the recent financial crisis and ensuing recession. Moreover, more than two years after the beginning of the recent crisis, U.S. policymakers have still not agreed on a strategy to reverse recent fiscal deterioration or address longer-term fiscal pressures.
In 2003-2008, the U.S.'s general (total) government deficit fluctuated between 2% and 5% of GDP. Already noticeably larger than that of most 'AAA' rated sovereigns, it ballooned to more than 11% in 2009 and has yet to recover.
On April 13, President Barack Obama laid out his Administration's medium-term fiscal consolidation plan, aimed at reducing the cumulative unified federal deficit by US$4 trillion in 12 years or less. A key component of the Administration's strategy is to work with Congressional leaders over the next two months to develop a commonly agreed upon program to reach this target. The President's proposals envision reducing the deficit via both spending cuts and revenue increases, and the adoption of a "debt failsafe" legislative mechanism that would trigger an across-the-board spending reduction if, by 2014, budget projections show that federal debt to GDP has not yet stabilized and is not expected to decline in the second half of the current decade.
The Obama Administration's proposed spending cuts include reducing non-security discretionary spending to levels similar to those proposed by the Fiscal Commission in December 2010, holding growth in base security (excluding war expenditure) spending below inflation, and further cost-control measures related to health care programs. Revenue would be increased via both tax reform and allowing the 2001 and 2003 income and estate tax cuts to expire in 2012 as currently scheduled--though only for high-income households. We note that the President advocated the latter proposal last year before agreeing with Republicans to extend the cuts beyond their previously scheduled 2011 expiration. The compromise agreed upon in December likely provides short-term support for the economic recovery, but we believe it also weakens the U.S.'s fiscal outlook and, in our view, reduces the likelihood that Congress will allow these tax cuts to expire in the near future. We also note that previously enacted legislative mechanisms meant to enforce budgetary discipline on future Congresses have not always succeeded.
Key members in the U.S. House of Representatives have also advocated fiscal tightening of a similar magnitude, US$4.4 trillion, during the coming 10 years, but via different methods. House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan's plan seeks to balance the federal budget by 2040, in part by cutting non-defense spending. The plan also includes significantly reducing the scope
of Medicare and Medicaid, while bringing top individual and corporate tax rates lower than those under the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.
We view President Obama's and Congressman Ryan's proposals as the starting point of a process aimed at broader engagement, which could result in substantial and lasting U.S. government fiscal consolidation. That said, we see the path to agreement as challenging because the gap between the parties remains wide. We believe there is a significant risk that Congressional negotiations could result in no agreement on a medium-term fiscal strategy until after the fall 2012 Congressional and Presidential elections. If so, the first budget proposal that could include related measures would be Budget 2014 (for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, 2013), and we believe a delay beyond that time is possible.
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures the Congress and the Administration might conclude are appropriate. But for any plan to be credible, we believe that it would need to secure support from a cross-section of leaders in both political parties.
If U.S. policymakers do agree on a fiscal consolidation strategy, we believe the experience of other countries highlights that implementation could take time. It could also generate significant political controversy, not just within Congress or between Congress and the Administration, but throughout the country. We therefore think that, assuming an agreement between Congress and the President, there is a reasonable chance that it would still take a number of years before the government reaches a fiscal position that stabilizes its debt burden. In addition, even if such measures are eventually put in place, the initiating policymakers or subsequently elected ones could decide to at least partially reverse fiscal consolidation.
In our baseline macroeconomic scenario of near 3% annual real growth, we expect the general government deficit to decline gradually but remain slightly higher than 6% of GDP in 2013. As a result, net general government debt would reach 84% of GDP by 2013. In our macroeconomic forecast's optimistic scenario (assuming near 4% annual real growth), the fiscal deficit would fall to 4.6% of GDP by 2013, but the U.S.'s net general government debt would still rise to almost 80% of GDP by 2013. In our pessimistic scenario (a mild, one-year double-dip recession in 2012), the deficit would be 9.1%, while net debt would surpass 90% by 2013. Even in our optimistic scenario, we believe the U.S.'s fiscal profile would be less robust than those of other 'AAA' rated sovereigns by 2013. (For all of the assumptions underpinning our three forecast scenarios, see "U.S. Risks To The Forecast: Oil We Have to Fear Is…," March 15, 2011, RatingsDirect.
Additional fiscal risks we see for the U.S. include the potential for further extraordinary official assistance to large players in the U.S. financial or other sectors, along with outlays related to various federal credit programs. We estimate that it could cost the U.S. government as much as 3.5% of GDP to appropriately capitalize and relaunch Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two financial institutions now under federal control, in addition to the 1% of GDP already invested (see "U.S. Government Cost To Resolve And Relaunch Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac Could Approach $700 Billion," Nov. 4, 2010, RatingsDirect). The potential for losses on federal direct and guaranteed loans (such as student loans) is another material fiscal risk, in our view. Most importantly, we believe the risks from the U.S. financial sector are higher than we considered them to be before 2008, as our downward revisions of our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on the U.S. to Group 3 from Group 2 in December 2009 and to Group 2 from Group 1 in December 2008 reflect (see "Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments," March 8, 2011, and "Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: United States of America," Feb. 1, 2010, both on RatingsDirect). In line with these views, we now estimate the maximum aggregate, up-front fiscal cost to the U.S. government of resolving potential financial sector asset impairment in a stress scenario at 34% of GDP compared with our estimate of 26% in 2007.
Beyond the short- and medium-term fiscal challenges, we view the U.S.'s unfunded entitlement programs (such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) to be the main source of long-term fiscal pressure. These entitlements already account for almost half of federal spending (an estimated 42% in fiscal-year 2011), and we project that percentage to continue increasing as long as these entitlement programs remain as they currently exist (see "Global Aging 2010: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Cost A Lot More Green," Oct. 25, 2010, RatingsDirect). In addition, the U.S.'s net external debt level (as we narrowly define it), approaching 300% of current account receipts in 2011, demonstrates a high reliance on foreign financing. The U.S.'s external indebtedness by this measure is one of the highest of all the sovereigns we rate.
While thus far U.S. policymakers have been unable to agree on a fiscal consolidation strategy, the U.S.'s closest 'AAA' rated peers have already begun implementing theirs. The U.K., for example, suffered a recession almost twice as severe as that in the U.S. (U.K. GDP declined 4.9% in real terms in 2009, while the U.S.'s dropped 2.6%). In addition, the U.K.'s net general government indebtedness has risen in tandem with that of the U.S. since 2007. In June 2010, the U.K. began to implement a fiscal consolidation plan that we believe credibly sets the country's general government deficit on a medium-term downward path, retreating below 5% of GDP by 2013.
We also expect that by 2013, France's austerity program, which it is already implementing, will reduce that country's deficit, which never rose to the levels of the U.S. or U.K. during the recent recession, to slightly below the U.K. deficit. Germany, which suffered a recession of similar magnitude to that in the U.K. (but has enjoyed a much stronger recovery), enacted a constitutional limit on fiscal deficits in 2009 and we believe its general government deficit was already at 3% of GDP last year and will likely decrease further. Meanwhile, Canada, the only sovereign of the peer group to suffer no major financial institution failures requiring direct government assistance during the crisis, enjoys by far the lowest net general government debt of the five peers (we estimate it at 34% of GDP this year), largely because of an unbroken string of balanced-or-better general government budgetary outturns from 1997 through 2008. Canada's general government deficit never exceeded 4% of GDP during the recent recession, and we believe it will likely return to less than 0.5% of GDP by 2013.
Outlook
The negative outlook on our rating on the U.S. sovereign signals that we believe there is at least a one-in-three likelihood that we could lower our long-term rating on the U.S. within two years. The outlook reflects our view of the increased risk that the political negotiations over when and how to address both the medium- and long-term fiscal challenges will persist until at least after national elections in 2012.
Some compromise that achieves agreement on a comprehensive budgetary consolidation program--containing deficit reduction measures in amounts near those recently proposed, and combined with meaningful steps toward implementation by 2013--is our baseline assumption and could lead us to revise the outlook back to stable. Alternatively, the lack of such an agreement or a significant further fiscal deterioration for any reason could lead us to lower the rating.
Standard & Poor's will hold a global teleconference call and Web cast today--April 18, 2011--at 11:30 a.m. New York time (4:30 p.m. London time). For dial-in and streaming audio details, please go to www.standardandpoors.com/cmlive.
From S&P:
Overview
We have affirmed our 'AAA/A-1+' sovereign credit rating on the United States of America.
•The economy of the U.S. is flexible and highly diversified, the country's effective monetary policies have supported output growth while containing inflationary pressures, and a consistent global preference for the U.S. dollar over all other currencies gives the country unique external liquidity.
•Because the U.S. has, relative to its 'AAA' peers, what we consider to be very large budget deficits and rising government indebtedness and the path to addressing these is not clear to us, we have revised our outlook on the long-term rating to negative from stable.
•We believe there is a material risk that U.S. policymakers might not reach an agreement on how to address medium- and long-term budgetary challenges by 2013; if an agreement is not reached and meaningful implementation does not begin by then, this would in our view render the U.S. fiscal profile meaningfully weaker than that of peer 'AAA' sovereigns.
Rating Action
On April 18, 2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'AAA' long-term and 'A-1+' short-term sovereign credit ratings on the United States of America and revised its outlook on the long-term rating to negative from stable.
Rationale
Our ratings on the U.S. rest on its high-income, highly diversified, and flexible economy, backed by a strong track record of prudent and credible monetary policy. The ratings also reflect our view of the unique advantages stemming from the dollar's preeminent place among world currencies. Although we believe these strengths currently outweigh what we consider to be the
U.S.'s meaningful economic and fiscal risks and large external debtor position, we now believe that they might not fully offset the credit risks over the next two years at the 'AAA' level.
The U.S. is among the most flexible high-income nations, with both adaptable labor markets and a long track record of openness to capital flows. In addition, its public sector uses a smaller share of national income than those of most 'AAA' rated countries--including its closest peers, the U.K., France, Germany, and Canada (all AAA/Stable/A-1+)--which implies greater
revenue flexibility.
Furthermore, the U.S. dollar is the world's most used currency, which provides the U.S. with unique external flexibility; the vast majority of U.S. trade flows and external liabilities are denominated in its own dollars. Recent depreciation of the currency has not materially affected this position, and we do not expect this to change in the medium term (see "Après Le Déluge, The U.S. Dollar Remains The Key International Currency," March 10, 2010, RatingsDirect).
Despite these exceptional strengths, we note the U.S.'s fiscal profile has deteriorated steadily during the past decade and, in our view, has worsened further as a result of the recent financial crisis and ensuing recession. Moreover, more than two years after the beginning of the recent crisis, U.S. policymakers have still not agreed on a strategy to reverse recent fiscal deterioration or address longer-term fiscal pressures.
In 2003-2008, the U.S.'s general (total) government deficit fluctuated between 2% and 5% of GDP. Already noticeably larger than that of most 'AAA' rated sovereigns, it ballooned to more than 11% in 2009 and has yet to recover.
On April 13, President Barack Obama laid out his Administration's medium-term fiscal consolidation plan, aimed at reducing the cumulative unified federal deficit by US$4 trillion in 12 years or less. A key component of the Administration's strategy is to work with Congressional leaders over the next two months to develop a commonly agreed upon program to reach this target. The President's proposals envision reducing the deficit via both spending cuts and revenue increases, and the adoption of a "debt failsafe" legislative mechanism that would trigger an across-the-board spending reduction if, by 2014, budget projections show that federal debt to GDP has not yet stabilized and is not expected to decline in the second half of the current decade.
The Obama Administration's proposed spending cuts include reducing non-security discretionary spending to levels similar to those proposed by the Fiscal Commission in December 2010, holding growth in base security (excluding war expenditure) spending below inflation, and further cost-control measures related to health care programs. Revenue would be increased via both tax reform and allowing the 2001 and 2003 income and estate tax cuts to expire in 2012 as currently scheduled--though only for high-income households. We note that the President advocated the latter proposal last year before agreeing with Republicans to extend the cuts beyond their previously scheduled 2011 expiration. The compromise agreed upon in December likely provides short-term support for the economic recovery, but we believe it also weakens the U.S.'s fiscal outlook and, in our view, reduces the likelihood that Congress will allow these tax cuts to expire in the near future. We also note that previously enacted legislative mechanisms meant to enforce budgetary discipline on future Congresses have not always succeeded.
Key members in the U.S. House of Representatives have also advocated fiscal tightening of a similar magnitude, US$4.4 trillion, during the coming 10 years, but via different methods. House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan's plan seeks to balance the federal budget by 2040, in part by cutting non-defense spending. The plan also includes significantly reducing the scope
of Medicare and Medicaid, while bringing top individual and corporate tax rates lower than those under the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.
We view President Obama's and Congressman Ryan's proposals as the starting point of a process aimed at broader engagement, which could result in substantial and lasting U.S. government fiscal consolidation. That said, we see the path to agreement as challenging because the gap between the parties remains wide. We believe there is a significant risk that Congressional negotiations could result in no agreement on a medium-term fiscal strategy until after the fall 2012 Congressional and Presidential elections. If so, the first budget proposal that could include related measures would be Budget 2014 (for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, 2013), and we believe a delay beyond that time is possible.
Standard & Poor's takes no position on the mix of spending and revenue measures the Congress and the Administration might conclude are appropriate. But for any plan to be credible, we believe that it would need to secure support from a cross-section of leaders in both political parties.
If U.S. policymakers do agree on a fiscal consolidation strategy, we believe the experience of other countries highlights that implementation could take time. It could also generate significant political controversy, not just within Congress or between Congress and the Administration, but throughout the country. We therefore think that, assuming an agreement between Congress and the President, there is a reasonable chance that it would still take a number of years before the government reaches a fiscal position that stabilizes its debt burden. In addition, even if such measures are eventually put in place, the initiating policymakers or subsequently elected ones could decide to at least partially reverse fiscal consolidation.
In our baseline macroeconomic scenario of near 3% annual real growth, we expect the general government deficit to decline gradually but remain slightly higher than 6% of GDP in 2013. As a result, net general government debt would reach 84% of GDP by 2013. In our macroeconomic forecast's optimistic scenario (assuming near 4% annual real growth), the fiscal deficit would fall to 4.6% of GDP by 2013, but the U.S.'s net general government debt would still rise to almost 80% of GDP by 2013. In our pessimistic scenario (a mild, one-year double-dip recession in 2012), the deficit would be 9.1%, while net debt would surpass 90% by 2013. Even in our optimistic scenario, we believe the U.S.'s fiscal profile would be less robust than those of other 'AAA' rated sovereigns by 2013. (For all of the assumptions underpinning our three forecast scenarios, see "U.S. Risks To The Forecast: Oil We Have to Fear Is…," March 15, 2011, RatingsDirect.
Additional fiscal risks we see for the U.S. include the potential for further extraordinary official assistance to large players in the U.S. financial or other sectors, along with outlays related to various federal credit programs. We estimate that it could cost the U.S. government as much as 3.5% of GDP to appropriately capitalize and relaunch Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two financial institutions now under federal control, in addition to the 1% of GDP already invested (see "U.S. Government Cost To Resolve And Relaunch Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac Could Approach $700 Billion," Nov. 4, 2010, RatingsDirect). The potential for losses on federal direct and guaranteed loans (such as student loans) is another material fiscal risk, in our view. Most importantly, we believe the risks from the U.S. financial sector are higher than we considered them to be before 2008, as our downward revisions of our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on the U.S. to Group 3 from Group 2 in December 2009 and to Group 2 from Group 1 in December 2008 reflect (see "Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments," March 8, 2011, and "Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: United States of America," Feb. 1, 2010, both on RatingsDirect). In line with these views, we now estimate the maximum aggregate, up-front fiscal cost to the U.S. government of resolving potential financial sector asset impairment in a stress scenario at 34% of GDP compared with our estimate of 26% in 2007.
Beyond the short- and medium-term fiscal challenges, we view the U.S.'s unfunded entitlement programs (such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) to be the main source of long-term fiscal pressure. These entitlements already account for almost half of federal spending (an estimated 42% in fiscal-year 2011), and we project that percentage to continue increasing as long as these entitlement programs remain as they currently exist (see "Global Aging 2010: In The U.S., Going Gray Will Cost A Lot More Green," Oct. 25, 2010, RatingsDirect). In addition, the U.S.'s net external debt level (as we narrowly define it), approaching 300% of current account receipts in 2011, demonstrates a high reliance on foreign financing. The U.S.'s external indebtedness by this measure is one of the highest of all the sovereigns we rate.
While thus far U.S. policymakers have been unable to agree on a fiscal consolidation strategy, the U.S.'s closest 'AAA' rated peers have already begun implementing theirs. The U.K., for example, suffered a recession almost twice as severe as that in the U.S. (U.K. GDP declined 4.9% in real terms in 2009, while the U.S.'s dropped 2.6%). In addition, the U.K.'s net general government indebtedness has risen in tandem with that of the U.S. since 2007. In June 2010, the U.K. began to implement a fiscal consolidation plan that we believe credibly sets the country's general government deficit on a medium-term downward path, retreating below 5% of GDP by 2013.
We also expect that by 2013, France's austerity program, which it is already implementing, will reduce that country's deficit, which never rose to the levels of the U.S. or U.K. during the recent recession, to slightly below the U.K. deficit. Germany, which suffered a recession of similar magnitude to that in the U.K. (but has enjoyed a much stronger recovery), enacted a constitutional limit on fiscal deficits in 2009 and we believe its general government deficit was already at 3% of GDP last year and will likely decrease further. Meanwhile, Canada, the only sovereign of the peer group to suffer no major financial institution failures requiring direct government assistance during the crisis, enjoys by far the lowest net general government debt of the five peers (we estimate it at 34% of GDP this year), largely because of an unbroken string of balanced-or-better general government budgetary outturns from 1997 through 2008. Canada's general government deficit never exceeded 4% of GDP during the recent recession, and we believe it will likely return to less than 0.5% of GDP by 2013.
Outlook
The negative outlook on our rating on the U.S. sovereign signals that we believe there is at least a one-in-three likelihood that we could lower our long-term rating on the U.S. within two years. The outlook reflects our view of the increased risk that the political negotiations over when and how to address both the medium- and long-term fiscal challenges will persist until at least after national elections in 2012.
Some compromise that achieves agreement on a comprehensive budgetary consolidation program--containing deficit reduction measures in amounts near those recently proposed, and combined with meaningful steps toward implementation by 2013--is our baseline assumption and could lead us to revise the outlook back to stable. Alternatively, the lack of such an agreement or a significant further fiscal deterioration for any reason could lead us to lower the rating.
Standard & Poor's will hold a global teleconference call and Web cast today--April 18, 2011--at 11:30 a.m. New York time (4:30 p.m. London time). For dial-in and streaming audio details, please go to www.standardandpoors.com/cmlive.
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